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Abstract. The study investigates the imperative of corporate governance on profitability of 
privatized cement industry in Nigeria. The variables studied were Rate of Returns as 
dependent variables and fourteen Corporate Governance proxies as independent 
variables. Data was collected from secondary sources, and the statistical tools employed in 
the Methodology were descriptive statistics and Pooled OLS regressions. The study aimed 
at bridging literature gap on studies that relate corporate governance and privatization 
policy in Nigeria. The results suggest that, no remarkable improvement of profitability post 
privatization due to challenges of exogenous factors such as macroeconomic environment 
instability and weak private sector. The industry witnessed changes in corporate 
governance such as adopting effective cost management and proactive business strategies, 
exposure to competition, withdrawal of Government subsidy and special grant post 
privatisation. Board Size and Workforce have positive and significant impact on Cement 
industry’s profitability, while, State Ownership, Institutional Ownership, Minority 
ownership, Percentage of Executive Directors and Privatization with time have negative 
and significant impact on company’s profitability. Conversely, Foreign Investors, 
Percentage of Non-Executive Directors and Percentage of Management Staff have positive 
and insignificant impact on the Cement industry’s profitability. Thus, it will be pertinent 
to conclude that the result has accepted Alternative Hypothesis that corporate governance 
has significant impact on the Cement industry’s performance (AROA), despite the 
challenges of microeconomic environment instability. The study recommends that, 
Government needs to stabilize macroeconomic environment and strengthen private sector. 
The Cement Industry needs to ensure right procedure of the selection of Non-Executive 
Directors, create incentive for foreign investor participation, ensure Payment of dividend, 
less government interference and accountability. Mechanisms such as efficient and 
independent audit committee, competent executive directors and professional 
management team need to be put in place to address the negative and insignificant impact 
of management staff on the industry. 
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1. Introduction 
ffective corporate governance enhances corporate performance via 
harmonisation of conflicting interests of stakeholders and stimulating 
balanced growth among corporate objectives. It is a strong and 
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efficient mechanism for restraining expropriation and securing foreign and 
domestic finance to introduce new technologies as well as prowess workers’ 
and managerial expertise at all levels (Masu-Gombe, 2015). Capitalist 
economies depend on the efficiency of their corporations which are largely 
determined by the way and manner the Board of Directors and the 
Management are discharging their stewardship responsibilities. The 
effectiveness with which they discharge their responsibilities in the 
contextual framework of transparency, integrity and accountability, in 
serving the modest interest of corporate stakeholders and its overall 
objectives, determine the level of investors’ confidence and the security of 
the wealth invested in a corporation; which is the essence of any system of 
good corporate governance (Masu-Gombe, 2015). “Greater clarity to the 
respective responsibilities of directors, shareholders and auditors strengthen 
trust in the corporate system. Thus, corporate governance is the system by 
which companies are directed and controlled’’ (Cadbury, 1992). Failure in 
corporate governance system in a country’s corporations, undoubtedly, 
preludes into conflict that will affect firms’ stewardship and performance 
that consequently have adverse spill over effect on the economy governance 
(Masu-Gombe, 2015). 
 
1.1. Statement of the problem 
Study of corporate governance related to pre and post privatisation is a 
recent phenomenon that gains little attention from academic circle and 
policy makers in Nigeria (Okeahalam, & Akinbode, 2003). Therefore, the 
study aimed at bridging the literature gap.   
 
1.2. Research objectives 
The study has broad and specific objective. The broad objective is to study 
the imperative of corporate governance on profitability of privatized cement 
industry. The specific objectives are; To ascertain the challenges of cement 
industry pre and post privatization. And to examine the significance of 
corporate governance on the profitability of cement industry. 
 
1.3. Significance of the Study 
Nigerian universities offer courses on corporate governance at 
postgraduate and undergraduate levels; similarly, professional institutions 
and some supervisory agencies have research wings dedicated to the subject 
matter in Nigeria. This implied that the findings will contribute to; 
knowledge, academics, policy makers, cement industry and the economic 
environments of the country at large. 
 
1.4. Scope and limitations 
The scope of research focused on imperatives of corporate governance on 
profitability of cement industry in Nigeria for the period 1991 – 2011. 
However, the limitation of the study is the used of secondary data that is 
subject to companies’ internal manipulations, which is well known by the 
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researchers. In this regard, the researcher used the certified data from 
Annual Reports of cement companies identified as study sample in the 
cement industry of Nigeria and BPE Reports respectively. Notably the paper 
is extracted from my Ph.D  Thesis.   
The paper is organized in the following subheadings; Concept of 
Corporate Governance, Concept of Corporate Performance, Concept of 
profitability, Theoretical framework, Empirical Review, Methodology, 
Inferential Statistics Result, Conclusion and Recommendations. 
 
2. Literature review and theoretical framework 
At this point, related literature is reviewed and discussed on concepts, 
empirical evidences and theories.  
 
2.1. Concept of corporate governance 
Boubakri, et al., (1999), Turnball (1997) and Dyck (2001) view corporate 
governance as institutional framework that influences the integrity of 
transactions, resource allocations, returns on investments, and at the same 
time, determines the control and direction of the corporation’s delegated 
decision making for the production of goods and services in the best interest 
of the corporation’s owners.  It encompasses all set of processes, customs, 
policies, laws and institutions that ensure credible flow of information, 
accountability and transparency with a view to achieving long term strategic 
goals of stakeholders (Wikipedia, 2010). Furthermore, Okeahalam & 
Akinbode (2003) assert that corporate governance comprises the 
establishment of appropriate legal, economic and institutional environment 
that permits corporations to operate as entities for promoting shareholders 
value, maximising human centred development and discharging 
responsibilities to stakeholders, environment and the society in general. 
In line with these conceptual views, Salacuse & Braker (2002), La Porta, et 
al., (2002) and others, define corporate governance as a system of rules and 
regulations which determine the control and direction of the corporation as 
well as define relationship among the corporate primary participants 
(Salacuse & Braker, 2002). It is a set of mechanisms through which outside 
investors protect themselves against the expropriation of the insiders (La 
Porta, et al, 2002). Thus, expropriation means; direct theft, selling firm 
security below market price to management staff, mostly, in firms that 
management controlled. And it also means investor’s dilution, diversion of 
corporate opportunities, installing incompetent family members on 
managerial position and wasteful project (Salacuse, & Braker, 2002). 
O’Donovan, as cited by Wikipedia (2010) defines corporate governance as an 
internal system encompassing policies, processes and people which serve 
the needs of shareholders and other stakeholders by directing and 
controlling management activities with good business savvy, objectivity, 
accountability and integrity.  
In a nutshell, corporate governance is a systematic social relation among 
corporate participants, guided by constitutional provisions, business ethics, 
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and corporate internal regulations, aimed at protecting the rights and 
privileges of principals, obligation of agents and other stakeholders via 
incentives, transparency and accountability that will enable the corporation 
to achieve long-term objectives of operational and financial efficiencies plus 
excellent return on investment that will uplift firm value (Masu-Gombe 
2015). In this regards, financial efficiency means profitability. 
 
2.2. Concept of profitability 
Profitability is the ability of management to utilize company assets to 
make profit. It shows how management can efficiently use all resources 
available in the market to generate returns on investment. According to 
Harward & Upton (1961), ‘’profitability is the ‘the ability of a given 
investment to earn a return from its use.” However, the term Profitability’ is 
not synonymous to the term ‘Efficiency’. Profitability is an index of 
efficiency; and is regarded as a measure of efficiency and management guide 
to greater efficiency. Profitability Ratio is a financial performance measure 
that reveals how corporate governance is managing corporate resources 
profitably (Ainworth, et al., 1997). In another word, it is an indicator of how 
profitable a company is relative to its total assets. It gives an idea as to how 
efficient management was at using its assets to generate earnings. The ratio 
estimates performance from a backward-looking perspective and reflects 
what the management has accomplished (Dhamija, 2010). According to 
Kento (2019) profitability ratio is a class of financial metrics that is used to 
assess a business's ability to generate earnings relative to its revenue, 
operating costs, balance sheet assets, and shareholders' equity over time, 
using data from a specific point in time. 
Kento (2019) postulates the importance of profitability ratios to corporate 
governance. He argues that profitability ratios reveals how well 
management used corporate assets to generate profit and value for 
shareholders, provide historical information for comparing past and present 
performance and performance of other companies in the industry. He 
further states that, having a higher profitability value relative to a 
competitor's ratio or previous performance means the company is doing 
well. He divided Profitability Ratio into two categories: Margin Ratios and 
Return ratios. Margin ratios give insight on ability of company to turn sales 
into profit. Profit Margins are used to measure a company's profitability at 
various cost levels, including gross margin, operating margin, pretax 
margin, and net profit margin. The margins shrink as layers of additional 
costs are taken into consideration, such as the cost of goods sold (COGS), 
operating and non-operating expenses, and taxes paid. Gross margin 
measures how much a company can mark up sales above COGS. Operating 
margin is the percentage of sales left after covering additional operating 
expenses. The pretax margin shows a company's profitability after further 
accounting for non-operating expenses. Net profit margin concerns a 
company's ability to generate earnings after taxes. 
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Return ratios examine how well a company generates returns for its 
shareholders. In this regards, profitability is assess relative to costs and 
expenses, and it is analyzing in comparison to assets, to see how effective a 
company is in deploying assets to generate sales and eventually profits. The 
term return in assets ratio refers to net profit or net income, that means is the 
amount of earnings from sales after all costs, expenses, and taxes (Kento, 
2019).Return on Equity is a ratio that concerns a company's equity holders 
because it measures their ability to earn a return on their equity investments. 
Larger assets base increases Return on Equity dramatically without any 
equity addition and result into higher benefit (Kento, 2019). 
Based on kento’s perspectives and that of Harward & Upton above, we 
can understand why corporate governance scholars chose to use return on 
asset as proxy of performance not profit Margin Ratio. Kento categorized 
profitability ratio in two broader terms i.e Margin Ratios and Return Ratios, 
in this regards, Kento viewed Return on Asset as performance proxy that 
align shareholders interest with their investment because is centered on how 
management used assets sufficiently to generate returns on investment or 
net profit, while Margin Ration align the interest of Management with 
Investment because it focused on the ability of management to turn sales into 
profit. It simply talks about gross earnings or profit that has less meaning to 
investors (Masu-Gombe, 2020).  In addition to that, Harward & Upton (1961) 
view profitability ratio, particularly, return on asset as index of efficiency. 
This conformed to the central themes of corporate governance; protection of 
stakeholder’s interest, most especially the shareholders and ensuring 
efficient management of firm resources operationally. The second assertion 
is that, their analysis revealed scholars agreement on profitability as financial 
measure that enable corporate stakeholders to assess investment viability as 
well as management operational efficacy and accountability. Thirdly, their 
postulations justify our choice of shareholders theory as get way to our 
research (Masu-Gombe 2020). 
 
2.3. Emprical review 
Al Homaidi, et al., (2019) study the impact of corporate governance on 
Return on Assets (ROA), Net Interest Margin (NIM) and Earning Per Share 
(EPS). Result suggest that; board size has positive and significant impact on 
Return On Assets and Earning Per Share, however, has negative and 
insignificant impact on Net Interest Margin, board diligence has positive and 
significant impact on Return on Assets, Net Interest Margin and Earning Per 
Share, audit committee size has positive and significant impact Return on 
Assets and has negative and insignificant impact on Net Interest Margin and 
Earning Per Share. Institutional ownership has positive and significant 
impact Return on Assets and Net Interest Margin but it has negative and 
insignificant impact on Earnings Per Share. board composition has negative 
and insignificant impact on Return on Assets while has positive and 
significant impact on Net Interest Margin and Earning Per Share, audit 
committee composition has negative and insignificant impact on Return on 
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Assets, however, has positive and significant impact on Net Interest Margin 
and Earning Per Share, audit committee diligence has negative and 
insignificant impact on Net Interest Margin and EPS while positive and 
significant impact Return on Assets and company age has negative and 
insignificant impact on Return on Assets and has positive and significant 
impact Earnings Per Share. Size of the company has positive and significant 
impact Net Interest Margin 
Yameen, Farhan, & Tabash (2019) Find that board directors’ size and audit 
committee’s size negatively impact the performance of Indian hotels, while 
board directors’ composition and diligence, the audit committee’s 
composition and diligence and foreign ownership positively affect the 
performance of Indian hotels measured by accounting proxies. Results also 
reveal that board directors’ size, audit committee’s size, and foreign 
ownership positively impact the Indian hotels’ performance measured by 
marketing proxies, whereas board directors’ composition; board directors’ 
diligence; audit committee’s composition; and audit committee’s diligence 
have a negative impact on the performance of Indian hotels. 
Aljifri & Moustafa (2007) conducted an empirical study on the impact of 
corporate governance mechanism on the performance of UAE’s firms and 
they found that board size has impacted on firms’ performance. Similarly, 
Agbaeze, Ogosi, & Chinedu (2018) find that, there is a positive correlation 
between profitability, number of employees and board size of Nigerian 
banks. The result also reveals that board size has positive and significant 
impact on profitability of Nigerian banks. The same thing found by 
Uchenna1, et al., (2018) on Nigerian banking sector. 
Yousef (2016) finds that corporate governance variables have positive and 
significant impact on return on assets and return on equity on all listed 
Jordanian companies’ together and industrial sector. However, price on 
earnings ratio is not affected. In finance and services sectors, is onlyReturn 
on assets was affected by corporate governance variables. Al Homaidi, et al., 
(2019) find that board size, board diligence, audit committee size, and 
institutional ownership have a significant impact on ROA, while board 
composition, audit committee composition, audit committee diligence and 
company age have an insignificant effect on ROA. Separation of power 
between CEO and board chairmanship was well pronounced in UK, 
Germany and Netherlands but less pronounced in US and Nigeria. Even 
though it had negative effects on firms’ performance, nevertheless, their 
tenure has positive impact on profitability (Fodio, 2006; Coleman 2007; 
Ndama, 2010). Similarly, D’Souza, et al., (2006) finds that profitability has 
significant relationship with state ownership and restructuring, but negative 
relationship with employment. Real sales had positive relationship with 
restructuring and output. 
Birdsall & Nellis, (2002) find that privatization affects financial and 
operational performance where by significantly increasing firm profitability, 
real sales, operating efficiency, capital expenditure, investment and 
dividend policies, output as well as decrease leverage. Privatized firm’s 
corporate governance is more efficient than state-owned firm (Megginson, et 
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al., 2002), because they improve coverage, service quality and reliability as 
well as prices decline (Delfino & Casarin, 2001; Paredes, 2001; Arocena, 2001; 
Barjar & Uguiola, 2002). Muogbo (2013) finds that corporate governance has 
positive and significant relationship with privatization in terms of setting up 
sound corporate objectives and in maximizing shareholders wealth. This 
indicates that investment in privatized firms will be more profitable than 
investment in firms with government presence. These empirical reviews 
impacted positively on the paper most especially on the choice of study 
variables and methodology for the research.  
 
2.4. Theoretical framework 
Shareholders model of corporate governance 
A corporation is best able to create the goods and services needs of the 
society if it focused on its primary function of maximising gains to 
shareholders. To this ends, shareholders exercise control over the 
operational and financial decisions, managers have judiciary duty to harness 
both human and material resources to serve the best interest of the 
shareholders and the overall objective of the firm is focused on maximising 
share holders wealth (Iqbal, & Mirakhor, 2004). In this regard, the corporate 
governance structure focuses on investor-manager contract relation, not 
otherwise. Other corporate stakeholders like employees, suppliers, 
customers, creditors and community have no right over the wealth 
accumulated by the firm or to participate in the corporate decision making 
of the corporation.  
To justify the arguments, Arrow-Debreu model and fundamental 
theorem postulate that if firms’ objective is to maximise the wealth of their 
shareholders and individuals to pursue their own interest as embodied in 
the philosophy of ‘’invisible hand’’ the allocation is Pareto efficient. To 
buttress this point, fundamental theorem states that any Pareto efficient 
allocation can be implemented as competitive equilibrium given lump sum 
of taxes. In view of these assertions, the role of firm in a society is precisely 
to create wealth for the shareholders as embodied in the legal framework. 
For this reasons corporate governance pursuing the interest of shareholders 
is what is required for the efficient use of resources. 
Conversely, Iqbal & Mirakhor (2004) and Allen & Gale (2002), argue that 
the firm claimant goes beyond shareholders and bondholders alone; it must 
include explicit and implicit contractual interaction. This is because, all 
corporate constituencies provide asset in return for some gains. Contracts 
resulted from bargaining by these constituencies over the term of their 
compensations from post contractual expropriations. All stakeholders are 
regarded as contractors with firm, with their right determined through 
bargaining. So, limiting firm priorities to investor- manager contract is 
mischievous considering the human capital invested by the employee, 
investment in building relationship and forgone alternative opportunities by 
the suppliers and customers as well as the community that provides legal 
framework and business environment for the firm’s operation. 
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The model is silent on changes in corporate governance due to economic 
reforms such as privatisation that may arise. And it is static in a sense that it 
ignored externalities discovered to be good mechanisms for corporate 
control in recent time apart from financers. Nevertheless, the model will play 
a great role in identifying variables that will be useful in assessing the new 
objective of privatized firms in Nigeria (Masu-Gombe, 2015).   
 
3. Methodology 
The study used Trend Analysis and Pooled Ordinary Least Square (POLS) 
as statistical tools. Trend Analysis is used to serve objectives 1while pooled 
ordinary least square is employed to serve objective 2. Secondary data was 
used from the industry’s annual reports, and to enable us have a balanced 
data and accurate assessment, equal periods were taken pre and post 
privatization, spanning from 1991 to 2011. In the regression analysis, 
profitability ratio is used as dependent variable and fourteen corporate 
governance proxies as independent variables. Thus, profitability Ratio is 
calculated by dividing a company’s annual earnings by its total assets, ROA 
is displayed as a percentage. Sometimes this is referred to as "return on 
investment" (Dhamija, 2010). One important thing to be noted here, is that 
the research, adopted methodology used in research conducted by Dhamija 
(2010) on Nifty companies of India. To enable the model suit the requirement 
of this academic investigation, some improvements were made. Dhamija’s 
research considered Nifty Companies without secluding privatized firms 
among them, still the statistical tools employed and the variable used 
appeared to be comprehensive as well as relevant to our study. Besides that, 
most of the corporate governance scholars’ works reviewed in this research 
used similar or the same empirical models, even though with fewer 
variables. The researcher, therefore, extended the applicability of the models 
on Nigerian cement companies and established their validity. Even though, 
throughout the literature reviewed in this work no single researcher used 
performance trend analysis to identify factors that are affecting the efficiency 
of corporate governance as we did in this research.  
 
ROA =  Net income    =       EBIT  
Total Assets            FA+CA 
 
ROAit = β0 + β01ATMVS1it+ β02ASTOWN2it + β03AINST3it + β04AMINOWN4it + 
β05AFOREI5it + β06ABSIZE6it β07APED7it + β08APNED8it + β09ADUAL9it + 
β010ACACNE10it + β011AWF11it + β012APMS12it + β13 APNMS13it + β14APRIV14it+ u it 
 
Independent variable 
a. ATMVS: market value of the company shares measured market 
capitalization of the companies. It reveals the level of investors assessment 
on the quality of the company‘s corporate governance which persuaded 
them to patronize the ownership of the companies.  The expect coefficient is 
positive. 
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b. ASTOWN: Measures the proportion of state ownership in the firms. 
The larger the proportion, the higher is the undue government interference. 
This implies that restructuring will be difficult in the firms. The coefficient is 
expected to be negative.  
c. AINST: measures the proportion of large institutional investors. The 
higher the proportion, the greater is the monitoring role of institutional 
investors. It also implies that managers of companies would be under 
pressure to perform to the expectations of institutional investors. The 
coefficient is expected to be positive. 
d. AMINOWN: Measures the proportion of minority shareholders in 
the firms. The higher the proportion, the higher the expropriation due 
monitoring cost. This implies that management will connive with 
concentrated shareholders to promote their personal interests as against the 
minority owners. The coefficient is expected to be negative.  
e. AFOREI: Measures the proportion of foreign investment in the 
corporations. The higher the proportion, the greater are the possibilities of 
infusing new talents, new technologies and restructuring. This implies that 
operational and financial reorganization will take place. The coefficient is 
expected to be positive.  
f. ABSIZE: the total number of directors in the board of a company. 
Cohesiveness of the Board members and having diverse expertise and 
experience may enhance the financial performance. Unwieldy group on the 
other hand may be detrimental to financial performance.  
g. APED the percentage of Executive Directors on the board of 
directors. It is defined as the number of Executive Directors divided by the 
total number of directors on the board of the company. The coefficient’s 
expected sign is positive, i.e., the lower the proportion, the more 
independent is the board in making decisions.. 
h. APENED: the percentage of independent directors on the board of 
directors. It is defined as the number of independent directors divided by 
the total number of directors on the board of the company. The coefficient’s 
expected sign is positive, i.e., the higher the proportion, the more 
independent is the board in making decisions. 
i. DUAL: a binary variable representing CEOs who also double as the 
chairmen of the board of directors. This variable takes the value of one if the 
CEO/Managing Director performs the dual role; otherwise it takes a value of 
zero. The coefficient’s expected sign is negative. This is because the 
effectiveness of the board as an internal governance device will be perceived 
to have been compromised by the roles not being separated. On the other 
hand, a unity of command structure can motivate the CEO to strive for 
excellent performance. If this is the case, the coefficient’s sign is expected to 
be positive. 
j. ACACNE: a binary variable representing the Chairman of the Audit 
Committee. If the Chairman of the Audit Committee is a nonexecutive 
director, the variable takes the value of one; otherwise, this variable takes a 
value of zero. This serves to test the degree of independence of the audit 
committee. An independent chairman is expected to contribute to a more 
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rigorous regime of monitoring and therefore improves performance of the 
company. 
k. AWF: Work force measures the total number of company employees. 
It reveals the impact of privatization on work force. The coefficient expected 
sign is negative. Higher size means higher cost of corporate governance.  
l. APMS: Measures the percentage of management staff that are 
directly involved in the corporate decision making and policy 
implementation in the company. It is defined as the number of management 
staff divided by the total number of the workforce of the company. The 
coefficient’s expected sign is positive. 
m. APNMS; measures the total number of company employees that are 
not involved in the corporate governance. It is defined as the number of non 
management staff divided by the total number of the workforce of the 
company. It reveals the impact of privatization on work force. The coefficient 
expected sign is negative. The higher the size, the higher the cost of corporate 
governance. 
n. PRIVt: Privatization with time which is dummy variable. 
The study included the above variables of corporate governance, which 
have been shown to be significant for the firm performance by the literature 
survey. This study measured the individual effect of corporate governance 
variable on the firm’s performance. 
 
4. Results interpretation and analysis 
4.1. Factors affecting corporate governance efficiency on the 
performance of cement industry 
Under this subheading, Cement industry performance trend analysis 
results were interpreted and the factors influencing corporate governance 
efficacy on the trends of the industry’s performance were analyzed 
accordingly. In interpreting the result of trend analysis certified information 
of chairmen’s statements, auditors’ reports and directors’ reports issued in 
the annual reports of the industry, within the observational periods were 
used judiciously. The interpretation and analysis were, adherently, based on 
impact of corporate governance decision making on the performance 
indicators. The Table 1. below presents the results accordingly. 
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Table 1. Distribution of Performance Trend Analysis Results of Cement Industry 
Observation  Profitability Ratio % 
1991  0.001% 
1992  0.001% 
1993  0.001% 
1994  0.001% 
1995  0.001% 
1996  0.001% 
1997  0.001% 
1998  0.001% 
1999  0.001% 
2000  -10% 
2001  -0.5% 
2002  -100% 
2003  -20% 
2004  0.001% 
2005  0.001% 
2006  0.001% 
2007  0% 
2008  0.001% 
2009  0.001% 
2010  0.001% 
2011  0.001% 
Source: Author’s computations 
 
The estimated aggregate demand for cement in Nigeria was 8 million tons 
in 1991, while the total capacity for all the industry was 5 million tones. 
However, the Industry produced 3.5 million tons in 1991 as against 4.1 
million tons in 1990. The capacity under-utilization emanated mostly from 
exogenous factors that have direct effect on cost of production and aggregate 
demand for cement products, such as devaluation of the naira, energy sector 
crises, political instability, importation of spare parts, banks strike as well as 
general economic activities. Furthermore, reduction of global oil prices from 
$23.284 to $18.418, again, negatively affected government revenue which 
resulted in curtailing government expenditure and slowdown in general 
macroeconomic activities of the country. Consequently, the aforementioned 
factors adversely impacted on Cement Industry ion Nigeria. In addition, 
high cost of funds, inadequate credit to private sector and social 
responsibilities observed by the industry, adversely affected profitability 
ratio as revealed by results of table 4.9.1 that Managements’ Efficiency in 
assets utilization to generate returns (profitability) was 0.001% from 1991 up 
to 1999. In 1999, the Federal Government of Nigeria introduced stabilization 
policies that controlled interest rate and foreign exchange, banned cement 
importation and reduced import duty on manufacturing equipment to zero, 
all in an effort to ginger the economic activities in the country. Above all, the 
industry’s firms were shortlisted among the companies to be privatized in 
the same year. These measures, eventually improved the productivity of the 
industry. In spite of these improvements, the Industry’s Profitability was 
stagnant at 0.001% in 1999, however, declined to -10% in 2000.  
Surprisingly, the results of post-privatization periods demonstrated the 
same pattern of performance trends with pre-privatization periods. The 
Turkish Economic Review 
B.M. Gombe, & I.H. Aliero, TER, 8(2), 2021, p.45-64. 
56 
56 
result revealed that corporate governance efficiency in assets utilization to 
generate returns to the shareholders was determined largely by same 
macroeconomic factors that influenced the activities of the company prior to 
privatization. Notably, 2000 and 2001 were transition periods of Cement 
industry from public ownership to private ownership, notwithstanding the 
performance trend of the industry was interpreted as follows: Profitability 
ratio was -0.5% in 2001 which means the industry was operating at a loss due 
to exposure to competition, withdrawal of subsidy and special grant.  
The dawn of industry privatization commenced in 2002. As expected, the 
industry entered into a Technical Operating Agreement with the new foreign 
partners. This culminated into structural adjustments that impacted 
positively on the quality of corporate governance and industry overall 
performance. The adjustments were more decentralized initiatives and 
better decision process such as; a true participation in decision making but 
not necessarily consensus, management leading by example and proactive 
employee contribution to group success. These new measures were 
complemented with an extensive program of reorganization such as review 
of staffing, working practice, training, recruitment and new remuneration 
package arrangement to harmonize with global standard and motivate 
employees’ commitment and efficiency. These factors played a great role in 
improving the quality of the industry’s corporate governance and overall 
performance. In the same year, the company’s corporate governance 
approved voluntary retirement of some permanent staff, paid their gratuity 
and consultants’ fees that conducted the disengagement exercise. Despite 
these developments, the macroeconomic environment was not favorable. 
The demand for cement was 5.5% lower than 2001 because States and 
Federal Governments halted all capital project that require cement and 
diverted public funds into financing election campaigns and programs that 
will be observed in the 2003. However, these measures and factors created 
temporary distortions that affected the industry’s performance adversely. 
Consequently, profitability declined to -10%,  
From early 2003 down to 2005, the Nigerian government realized 
handsome foreign earnings from the windfall of sales of crude oil which 
enabled the government to embark on capital projects that stimulated the 
demand for the industry’s products.  In the same period, government 
introduced reform policies that stabilized the Naira, encouraged the cement 
industry to embark on excess production to meet domestic demand and 
commence exportation of cement as producer nation. Besides that, some 
firms in the industry created three new sections to improve surveillance and 
daily operational efficiency, namely; sustainable development, logistics and 
strategy sections. To withstand the rigour of competitions, the industry 
adopted effective cost management and proactive business strategies. Yet, 
Performance trend analysis results of Table 1 reveals that corporate 
governance efficiency to utilize the firms’ assets to generate earnings had 
significantly deteriorated in 2003 to -20%. The situation improved in 2004 
where the profitability skyrocketed to 80%. However, it suddenly declined 
to 0.001% in 2005 and 2006 respectively.  
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Nigeria is accustomed to strangulating economic activities on the eve of 
every national election and 2007 was not an exception. Therefore, the 
macroeconomic environment was not favorable to the industry. Above all, 
for political reasons that led Federal Government to issue licenses for 
importation of cement without embarking on any fiscal policy to create 
matching demand in the economy, erratic power supply coupled with 
shortage of LPFO supply led to fall in domestic demand and high cost of 
production. These factors led decline in the industry’s profitability to 0%. 
Fortunately, in 2008 Cement industry’s corporate governance took 
advantage of Federal Government desire to accomplish power project and 
increased production to match the demand of the project. Consequently, 
profitability rose to 0.001% and remain constant up to 2011. However, in 
2009, the domestic economy was seriously affected with global financial 
crisis as well as introduction of deregulation in oil sector inflicted high cost 
of production on the industry. Which when taken together resulted in 
maintaining profitability at 0.001% from 2009 down to 2011. 
 
4.2. Inferentail statistics results 
Null Hypothesis: Corporate governance does not have significant impact 
on Cement industry’s performance (profitability Ratio). 
Alternative Hypothesis: Corporate governance has significant impact on 
Cement industry performance (profitability). 
 
Table 2. Distribution of Regression Results of Profitability Ratio on the Set of Independent 
Variables of Cement Industry 

















































Source: Author’s computations 
 
The profitability ratio result shows that management’s efficiency in assets 
utilization to generate returns (dependent variable) was associated with 
company corporate governance (independent variable) to the tune of R= 
90.4%. This implies that there is a strong relationship between Return on 
Assets and corporate governance decisions. Similarly, R2 result reveals that 
about 81.7% variation of return on asset was explained by the corporate 
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governance performance while the result of Adjusted R2 discloses that 
corporate governance proxies jointly accounted for 59.3% variation in Return 
on Assets (AROA). 
The calculated F-statistics is 3.654 and the estimated significant value is 
0.031.  Conducting the surrogate test at 1% statistical significance the model 
is strong in explaining the variation in Cement industry’s performance 
(profitability Ratio). In view of that it is concluded that the model has a good 
fit. 
The constant value of 838.279 was the average value of Return on Assets 
(AROA), in the absence of corporate governance variables. Holding other 
variables constant, the result suggests that the coefficient of ATMVS is -
3979E-10 and estimated significant value is 0.582. This means, a unit increase 
in ATMVS will lead to -3979E-10 decrease of Cement industry’s performance 
(profitability). Actually, the expected coefficient was positive, because 
investors used to patronize companies’ shares based on their assessment of 
profitability trend of the Industry. However, the result contradicted such 
expectations; this may not be unconnected with the fact that the value of 
company shares at the secondary market has no direct impact, in any way, 
in enhancing the company’s operational strategies, demand for or price of 
cement that consequently enhances corporate earnings. One fascinating 
thing to be noted here is that the p-value 0.582 establishes that ATMVS has 
no significant impact on the company’s profitability. In view of that it can be 
concluded that ATMVS has a negative and insignificant impact on Cement 
industry profitability. 
The result discloses that the coefficient of ASTOWN is -19.752, and the 
estimated significant value is 0.000.  This means, a unit increase of percentage 
of state ownership will leads to -912.973 decreases in Cement industry’s 
performance (profitability). However, the coefficient defies the expected 
coefficient of the study, which signifies that privatization of state ownership 
promotes corporate governance inefficiency by appointing incompetent 
people to managerial positions and board membership based on personal 
relationship and political interest (Okaehalam et al 2003). Even though the p-
value 0.000 asserts that it has significant impact on the company’s 
performance. Thus, average state ownership has negative and significant 
impact on cement industry performance (ROA) 
Furthermore, the coefficient of the percentage of institutional ownership 
(AINST) is -6.418 and the estimated significant value is 0.001. This indicates 
that a unit increase in AINST will lead to-6.418 decrease in Cement 
industry’s performance which defies the expected positive coefficient of the 
study that viewed institutional ownership as a positive development in 
corporate governance of the company. On the contrary, conducting 
surrogate test at 1% statistical significance, AINST has a significant impact 
on the Cement industry’s performance. Thus, AINST has negative and 
significant impact on the Cement industry’s performance. 
Similarly, the coefficient of minority ownership (AMINOWN) is -11.244 
and the estimated significant value is 0.001. In effect, a unit increase in 
AMINOWN will result to -11.244 decreases in profitability ratio (ROA). The 
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negative coefficient conformed with the expected negative coefficient of the 
study that viewed any unit increase in AMINOWN will result into paving 
illegal ways for mismanagement of company’s resource by the management 
team and easy ways of manipulating corporate decision making to favour 
the illegitimate interest of the concentrated shareholders to the detriment of 
the other stakeholders.  Furthermore, the P-value of MINOWN 0.001 is 
signifying that minority ownership has a significant impact on the 
company’s profitability in conducting surrogate test at 1% statistical 
significance. Thus minority ownership has negative and significant impact 
on Cement industry’s performance (Profitability Ratio). 
The AFOREI coefficient is 1.534 and the estimated significant value is 
0.844. The coefficient of the result is consistent with the coefficient of the 
study which discloses that foreign ownership will tie privatized firms to 
capital market and foreign investment, improve information disclosure and 
accountability, constrain national government expropriation, and increase 
liquidity (Dyck, 2000). The p-value concludes that foreign ownership has 
positive and insignificant impact on company’s performance. 
The coefficient of board size is 11.097 and the estimated significant value 
is 0.099. The coefficient value is suggesting that a unit increase in board size 
(ABSIZE) will bring about 11.097 increases in Return on Assets (ROA). This 
complied with the expected positive coefficient value of the study, believing 
that an increase in board membership with right people enhances board 
efficiency in decision making and checkmate management performance. 
However, this result is confirmed such assumption. The p-value of 0.099 is 
revealing that ABSIZE has significant impact on the company’s performance 
(profitability) in conducting surrogate test at 10% statistical significance. 
Thus board size has positive and significant impact on Cement industry’s 
performance (profitability).  
The result suggests that APED is -5.219 and the estimated significant 
value is 0.030. The negative coefficient of the percentage of executive 
directors conformed to the expected negative coefficient of the study which 
opines that the lower the percentage of the executive director the higher the 
board independence. Besides that, the p-value also indicates that APED has 
significant impact on the Cement industry’s performance in conducting 
surrogate test at 5% statistical significance. Hence, APED has a negative and 
significant impact on Cement industry’s performance. 
The result discloses that the coefficient value of percentage of 
nonexecutive directors is 9.492E-6 and the estimated significant value is 
0.999. Impliedly, a unit increase in percentage of non-executive directors 
(APNED) will lead to 9.492E-6 increase in Return on Assets. The positive 
coefficient of the result is consistent with the expected positive coefficient of 
the study, which opines that an increase in percentage of non-executive 
directors will enhance board independence. This means that their role in 
serving audit committee and other statutory committees will promote 
efficiency and will be a very strong positive signal for accountability and 
reliability in the financial information issued to all stakeholders of the 
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company. The p-value reveals that the APNED has positive and insignificant 
impact on Cement industry’s performance (profitability).  
Similar coefficient with different p-value was obtained in workforce result 
in relation to ROA. The coefficient is 0.282 and the estimated significant 
value is 0.007. The result states that a unit increases in WF will leads to 
6.000E-5 increase in Return on Assets (ROA). Unfortunately the coefficient 
of this result is quite contrary to the expected negative coefficient of the 
study, which suggests that an increase in WF will lead to decrease in 
profitability. However, the significant test result reveals that the workforce 
has significant impact on profitability. Thus workforce has positive and 
significant impact on Cement industry’s performance (profitability 
The coefficient of Average Percentage of Management Staff is 68.021 and 
the estimated significant value is 0.149. The result expresses that a unit 
increase of APMS will lead to 68.021 increases in Cement industry’s 
performance. The coefficient is consistent with the expected positive 
coefficient of the study which postulates that percentage of management 
staff measures the number of staff that is directly involved in corporate 
decision making, policy formulation and implementation. This signifies 
harmony between the decisions made by the board and management 
operational activities. However, the p-value 0.149 reveals that the APMS has 
no significant impact on the Cement industry’s performance. Therefore, 
APMS has positive and insignificant impact on Cement industry’s 
performance.   
Finally, -637.185 was the difference in Return on Assets (AROA) post-
privatization compared to pre-privatization and the estimated significant 
value is 0.069. The post-privatization negative coefficient is inconsistent with 
expected positive coefficient of the study, which argues that privatization 
will promote efficient corporate governance that will impact positively on 
Cement industry’s performance (AROA). The result conforms to what was 
obtained in trend analysis result that pre-privatization has higher 
profitability than post-privatization. This is because, prior to privatization 
the company was exerting monopoly power on price, enjoy subsidy, no 
competition and merging between cost of production and market price 
(profit) was favourable. Nonetheless, in conducting the surrogate test at 10% 
statistical significance, the p-value of 0.069 reveals that privatization has 
significant impact on the company’s performance (AROA). Therefore, 
privatization has negative and significant impact on Cement industry’s 
performance (AROA). 
 
4.3. Summary of the findings 
That, no remarkable improvement of profitability post privatization due 
to challenges of exogenous factors such as macroeconomic environment 
instability and weak private sector which culminated in to capacity under-
utilization in Cement Industry of Nigeria. The industry witnessed changes 
in corporate governance such as adopting effective cost management and 
proactive business strategies to mitigate the adverse effect of agency 
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problem, exposure to competition, withdrawal of Government subsidy and 
special grant. 
That Board size and workforce have positive and significant impact on 
Cement industry’s profitability. State ownership, Institutional ownership, 
Minority ownership, Percentage of Executive Directors and privatization 
have negative and significant impact on cement industry’s profitability. 
Percentage of Management Staff and Percentage of Non-Executive Directors 
have positive and insignificant impact on Cement industry’s profitability. 
Total Market Value of Shares andForeign ownership has a negative and 
insignificant impact on Cement industry’s profitability. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Based on the above findings, the study concludes that, corporate 
governance has significant impact on cement industry performance, its 
quality improved remarkably, however, macroeconomic environment 
instability militated against the industry’s profitability pre and post 
privatization. In view of that, the result rejected the Null Hypothesis, that 
corporate governance does not have significant impact on Cement industry’s 
performance in Nigeria. This finding confirmed with most of the previous 
findings. What distinguishes this study from most of the previous ones 
conducted on corporate governance in relation to privatization in Nigeria 
and otherwise, that I reviewed, none has identified factors that militated 




In view of the above conclusion the following recommendation were 
drawn. 
i. Government needs to stabilize macroeconomic environment as well 
as strengthen private sector in order to mitigate capacity underutilization of 
cement industry in Nigeria. 
ii. Regarding the Non-Executive Directors, the Cement Industry needs 
to ensure right procedure of selection, skill-mix that reflected the range of 
competence needed in the industry a formal training at the company's cost, 
to enable them discharge their duty effectively and bring an independent 
judgment to bear on issues of strategy, performance, resources, including 
key appointments, and standards of conduct. They also have to be 
independent of management and free from any business or other 
relationship which could materially interfere with the exercise of their 
independent judgment, apart from their fees and shareholding. 
iii. Furthermore, the industry needs to create incentive for foreign 
investor to participate fully, where necessary, in both decision and 
operational activities of the industry. 
iv. The industry needs to ensure Payment of dividend, less government 
interference and accountability to enable market value of shares to impact 
positively on the industry.  
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v. Mechanisms such as efficient and independent audit committee, 
competent executive directors and professional management team need to 
be put in place to address the negative and insignificant impact of 
management staff on the industry. 
 
7. Policy implications 
The policy implication of the study is that, government needs to introduce 
macroeconomic stabilization measures and private sector driven economic 
policies to improve effective demand of cement products of the industry. 
Also, the industry needs to put in place internal strategies that will create 
international market opportunities, sophisticated security measures, cheap 
inputs, prudent financial and inventories management that will improve 
profitability post privatization. A synergy need be established on corporate 
governance, privatization and the challenges of macroeconomic 
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